HELPLESS!!!

This is what happens when a nation thinks that it can defeat terrorists by sweeping their attacks under the carpet and trying to brush them off flies.

This is what happens when the nation decides to forget about their security when voting.

This is what happens when the concerned official cares more about his wardrobe, his masters and his own life.

This is what happens the leaders bicker about anti-terror laws and human rights but forget that even the thousand's who've died, and the hundred who died yesterday also had rights!

This is what happens when leaders think that supporting & condoning terrorism will get them votes from certain communities (the most disgusting height of stereotyping - as if the people who've died were only Hindus).

This is what happens when counter-terror agencies are not given technology, money, manpower or power, and aren't kept on a tight leash when they are.

This is what happens when you forget that those who died were people too, and not numbers.

This is what happens when we JUST STOP CARING!!!

Why is it that Gordon Brown talks of a "Vigourous response", while out great stooges only Condemn and Condole??

Will the government wake up at least now? Or are they waiting for their lives to be threatened (Dec 13??) till they decide that its time to act?

Youtube Terry & the Viral Video from Hell

If you've been following the defence aviation grapevine for the past week or so, you'd have surely heard about the so-called controversial video (Part 1 & 2) and comments by Col. Terrance Fornof of AFB Nellis about the Indian participation at Red Flag Nellis. Bharat-rakshak also had a lively discussion about the videos. Vishnu Som of NDTV, who was present at the exercise then gave a rebuttal to some of the points raised by the good Col on another BR thread. The other Indian DDM's obviously had a field day trying to rake in the TRPs by piggybacking on some of Fornof's "offensive" remarks about the Exercise and IAF.

I just saw the video (2 parts- 18 min), and disagree with most of the hyperbolic hyperventilators on the Indian side. The video was clearly an informal dinnertime discussion (listen to the clinks and clanks in the background) about the exercise, and given the video quality, location and steadiness I'm pretty sure it was an official video for USAF posterity that unf0rtunately (or fortunately??) got out.

Pilots are known to be a spirited and frisky bunch, and the language and enthusiastic tone of the talk, and the racuous response by the audience are indicators of this. Given that, its wholly unreasonable to expect these pilots to speak among themselves with a drollness reserved for diplomatic banquet-parties.

I will not talk about the factual mistakes that the Col. made, namely about the Su-30's engines, the Bison Radar, datalink and a few others... they are small errors that any pilot can make about an unfamiliar aircraft, and make no difference to the discussion itself. We can hardly expect our pilots to know what engine or datalink the F-16 has.

The major thrust was on three issues:

1. Su-30MKI, MKI vs F-22.

• TVC - Su-30 vs Raptor
• Size - big aircraft, big RCS
• Comparison with the F-15
  

2. Indian pilots and their experience with the Mig-21 Bison.

3. Issues faced during the exercise by both planes and pilots.


MKI vs Raptor:

I find this the most complimentary portion of the video itself, unlike most who saw it in negative light. The fact that a senior USAF pilot is acknowledging that the IAF has bridged a massive gap and is slightly better than the USAF itself is a big admission from a very gung-ho and egoistic bunch of people (pilots in general, and not the USAF itself. Just to clarify, Thats a good thing to be as a pilot).

More importantly, that Fornof was constantly comparing the Su-30 with the F-22 and talking about how reassured he was that the F-22 was a way better aircraft is amazing. We already knew that the MKI is nowhere close to the Raptor, which is really a revolution in aviation design, and to think that the USAF was worried that the Su-30 might be as good, or close to it till they saw it in action speaks volumes of the MKI's capabilities. Remember that the F-22's capabilities have been touted as much for its radar and sensors, and the American's have not got a look at the Su-30s 'tronics at all. So we still have a lot of hidden cards.

The major point that people found contentious was the "drill-his-brains-out" comment. Too bad they didn't see it for what it was - just a passionate and air-force way of describing tactics. Having faced and developed tactics for the F-22 (which again, Fornof pointed out, was really a very long shot), they were able to apply these tactics to the Su-30 against new pilots. And here, Fornof pointed out that this advantage was a long shot anyway, and you'd have to hope that the opposing pilot was dumb enough to do that. And some of the inexperienced Indian pilots did (according to Fornof) do that on an inferior aircraft (to the F-22) and got killed as a result.

The big thing is - Fornof himself states that the INDIANS WOULD FIX THIS FAST as they learnt and then, we'd beat the F-15s and F-16s "ON A REGULAR BASIS". Its a compliment to our pilot's, especially considering his disdain for the French and sympathy for the Korean's inexperience. Seems like there were only two real forces at Nellis - US and IAF. The fact that the only chink the USAF could find in our armor was a long shot that would be fixed anyway is a testament to our strength.

Of course, it has been pointed out that no 1vs1s were flown at Nellis. And the Cope-India thing also, there was no chest thumping by the IAF (Fornof does not mention the IAF, but only says Indians - the DDM and media obviously thumped their chests till it hurt, so Fornof could be referring to them as well, with good reason).

A small point about the TVC on the F-22 - Fornof points out that the F-22's TVC is only for Post-stall maneuvering, while the MKI's can be used for normal maneuvering as well... I'm no expert, but that does sound to me like an advantage to the MKI.

And if the USAF is saying that the only way to fight the Su-30MKI is the Raptor, god help the Pakistanis and Chinese who won't have either.

Indian pilots & the Mig-21 Bison

I'll start with the Mig-21 Bison, which Col. brought up to talk about the experience our pilots have come out of. Given the admiration he had for the capabilities of this 50 year old jet against even the modern F-15s and 16s, I think is a compliment.

The 1-vs-1, Fornof correctly pointed out (and most ppl missed) took place at Mount Home (as mentioned by Vishnu Som as well), but his points about having been drilled out has been rebutted by Som. I guess its a matter of perception, but even Vishnu has agreed that "there were days when several Su-30s were shot down". No aircraft is invincible, but as I mentioned above, given that the only chink (that we know of) that they could find was in the temporary inexperience of our younger pilots should be reassuring.

Just to point out, even in Cope India, 1 on 1 wasn't the main focus, as both USAF and IAF have mentioned. Another point to note is that Fornof was almost certainly talking about the sustained non-TVC rate, and talked about the F-15 being able to follow the MKI better than against a Raptor, after which the Pilot engages TVC on the turn to get an advantage. Again a case of not hearing the good Col. closely.

More importantly, he is extremely respectful and amazed at our zero error rate, which again shows the respect IAF has earned among their pilots.

Issues & Random points:

The point about fratricide has been explained by Vishnu, and is clearly not a fault. Fornof has not talked about the Frats by their aircraft, but the fact that our pilots have taken this issue so seriously is obviously another pointer that Fornof also notes.

RF Nellis, as the Col. mentions, is not like Alaska, which is a goodwill pageant, but a serious exercise aimed at creating coalitions - anybody says we're not respected by the US?? Fornof does mention (in a somewhat brusque manner), that we are not yet integrated with their forces. No one on this side of the world disputes that.

The FOD point itself was not so much an insult, but a matter of fact way of putting the point across. Fornof has explained about our reasons for the 60" spacing, and does mention quite clearly that a satisfactory workaround was found. Quite clearly no insult to anyone.

The major thrust of the talk was about how professional our pilots were, how good the Su-30 and even the Bison is, and how the ONLY way to be better is to get the Raptor. Simple. Nothing more, nothing less. What Fornof has said does corroborate to a large extent with what is coming out from our side. If it was only the casual and spade-a-spade manner of talking, too bad people listening didn't know a pilot's get-together from the Miss World pageant.

Now for something completely different...

Its unfortunate that I have to use that delightful Monty Python expression to digress to such a sombre and terrible subject; but it is one that seems to be on everyones mind at the moment. I'm talking about the death of Scarlett Keeling.

The questions that everyone is asking now is whether Goa is a safe place or not... what do you think. Perhaps we should ask Scarlett that question. Or her mother. Perhaps the answer is self evident when we consider the where. Any sane person would be able to figure out that a beach filled with drugs, booze and lecherous males isn't the safest place to hang around alone, or leave a fifteen year old girl. Which would obviously beg the question that everyone has been asking - why did the mother bring her 9 children to India, taking them out of school, leave them alone for months on end in an obviously seedy place and take off with her boyfriend? And what evidence or reason does she have to blame the Home Minister?

But there are a few questions that seem forgotten. Why was the murder initially covered up? Why has Ram Naik been trying to get Fiona's visa cancelled? And why has no action or investigation been carried out against the people who conspired to cover up this murder? Questions that have been obscured by a media that is always looking only for increased sales and TRPs.

Again digressing, Philip Hensher of The Independent has a very interesting commentary about this whole episode, not about the murder in particular, but more about the culture of western travellers and backpackers in other countries. Take a look:

Link

The reckless hedonism that shames Britons abroad
Philip Hensher, Tuesday, 18 March 2008

If, as Clausewitz said, war is the continuation of politics by other means, there is not much doubt what tourism is the continuation of. The age of imperialism may have ended decades ago, with the withdrawal of European forces from Asian and African countries and the granting of independence. No sooner had that occurred, however, than the tourists descended like a plague of locusts, all in search of an "authentic" experience: many ripping up and insulting the host cultures in the name of that bogus authenticity.

The Scarlett Keeling murder case has transfixed India's large and busy media with a glimpse of a way of life which few Indians can quite believe. A mother with nine children from four – or was it five – fathers. The children, whose schooling seems decidedly patchy, are taken to live on a beach in Goa for months on end in the name of some kind of nebulous larger "education". One of them, merely 15, is left to look after herself while the rest take off to Karnataka. On her own, she takes drugs, drinks a good deal of vodka, has sex with men she has just met – none of which seems to be unusual to her – and is quite quickly murdered.

Rarely can the expression "it will all end in tears" be so grimly literal, and I don't particularly want to add to the terrible burden of grief and guilt which Scarlett's mother, Fiona MacKeown, must have to shoulder from now on.

There are thousands of English teenagers exactly like Scarlett Keeling and not much about her life is unusual, apart from its grisly end. I dare say she was nice-natured and well-mannered; she drank and took drugs recklessly, as many teenagers do; she probably had the air of a streetwise girl, able to cope with situations, and only on reading her diary does it become apparent that she was virtually illiterate, extremely ignorant and as naïve as 15-year-olds have always been. We all know teenagers exactly like that.

(Read more)

The real LCA story

Former SA to PM Ashok Parthasarathi and Vice Adm. (retd) Raman Puri have explained what really happened to the LCA program in this extremely well written piece for The Hindu.

http://www.hindu.com/2008/03/09/stories/2008030958701000.htm

The case to support the indigenous LCA programme
Ashok Parthasarathi and Raman Puri

The facts with regard to perceived cost and time overruns and performance shortfalls in perspective

There have been several articles in the press critical of projects of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) in general, and specifically the programme relating to the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), now named Tejas, and the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme. Indeed, whenever a significant event that involves indigenous R&D, particularly defence-related, occurs, or a crucial decision is set to be taken, articles originating from within the defence “system,” or from vendors who see their business prospects threatened, appear. The real facts relating to the programme need to be put in context.

Performance shortfalls

The two issues on which the LCA project is criticised are cost and time overruns, and performance shortfalls. As regards the so-called time overruns, when the zero/go date for the project is taken as 1983, the critics fail to mention that what was sanctioned in 1983 was an ad hoc Rs.560 crore, pending full preparation of the Project Definition Document (PDD) — which is a fundamental step even to start the design and development process. The costs were to be finalised based on the PDD. This required the setting up of infrastructure in a hundred academic institutions and R&D laboratories and building up expertise to undertake the fundamental and application-oriented R&D required, and harnessing the design and engineering effort available largely in the public sector units for such a complex, state-of-the-art aircraft. The Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) discussed with Air Headquarters the Air Staff Requirement (ASR). Air Headquarters had requirements added to what was originally to be a replacement for the MiG-21. As a result, the ASR that was finalised was practically that for a Mirage 2000. But in the public perception the LCA remained as a replacement for MiG 21.

It look seven years, till 1990, to formulate the PDD. Based on this the ADA, in a report to the Ministry of Defence in 1990, gave a time-frame of seven years to develop the LCA and projected a financial requirement of Rs.4,000 crore. This included the building of four prototypes also. There had been a 25-year gap since the only fighter aircraft ever indigenously designed, developed and manufactured, namely the HF-24 Marut, had entered squadron service. So the period of seven years to set up a more advanced R&D infrastructure and build up even the core personnel needed to develop the technologies that the LCA’s ASR and PDD called for, was modest.

“Go-ahead”

After consideration, including by special committees, the Indian Air Force and the government gave the real operational go-ahead only in late-1993. Even that “go-ahead” covered the development of only two Technology Demonstrator Aircraft (TDA) without weaponisation. The funding approved was only of Rs.2,000 crore — half the amount requested for full-scale development. The first TDA flew in 2001, eight years from the real operational ‘go’ date, despite much additional R&D work that had to be undertaken due to the U.S. sanctions imposed in 1998.

Comments appeared in the media in 2001 quoting IAF sources to the effect that what the ADA had achieved was just a flying machine that was yet to be weaponised. Considering the nature and scope of the approval accorded in 1993, what else was to be expected? Using the money sanctioned for two TDAs, the ADA built four. Full-scale development, for which another Rs.2,000-plus crore was finally sanctioned, thus started only in late-2001. Some 1,200 hours of flight testing was to be undertaken to secure Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) from the IAF.

At that point, apart from the weaponisation requirements the project had to undergo extensive redesign to accommodate an air-to-air missile chosen by the IAF, which was considerably heavier and longer than what had been specified till 2000. The IAF had again changed its mind. This necessitated the complete redesign of the wing structure, using only composite materials in order to keep the weight within limits. The period of this redesign was also utilised to upgrade the avionics, to a completely open architecture.

Consequently, in “generational terms” the LCA is a fourth generation-plus aircraft with full networking capabilities. This made it more than comparable to anything the IAF had, and possibly would have, even after it acquires the 126 Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) now on tender, with first deliveries due eight years hence.

On the engine

It is true that the Kaveri engine for the LCA that the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) of the DRDO has been developing for 12 years has not yet met its technical performance targets and requires redevelopment. So far the GE 404 engine from the U.S., which powers the F-16 fighter-bomber, has been used to power the LCA. The problems the GTRE has with the Kaveri are not unusual in a complex fighter aircraft engine project being undertaken for the first time. Moreover, the financial sanction of about Rs.320 crore given for engine development was possibly only to cover the Project Definition Phase and some high-risk technology development effort. We do not know of a first-of-type high-technology fighter aircraft engine being developed anywhere in less than a multi-billion dollar programme and a 20-year-plus development cycle. Even Snecma, the sole fighter aircraft engine manufacturer in France, despite decades of experience in developing and manufacturing engines for Mirage III, V and F-1, took about a decade and $2.2 billion to develop the M-88 engine for the Mirage 2000. The development of the Kaveri is unlikely to cross $1 billion.

The LCA with a GE 404 engine has done 800-plus hours of flight-testing. Even with that engine the performance has been not only vastly superior to that of even the recently upgraded MiG 21 BIS (the IAF is operating almost 400 of the series), but it has shown itself to be comparable in many critical parameters to the Mirage 2000. Modifications to the aircraft structure are under way to reduce weight and improve engine performance. When the GTRE’s joint venture with a leading foreign engine manufacturer for further development is completed in the next four years, the Kaveri will be brought up to a performance level, superior to the GE 404. Fitted with it, the LCA will be truly comparable to the Mirage 2000 and in many respects even superior. And all this in an aircraft much lighter than the Mirage 2000.

Superior

As for network-centric capability, which intrinsically needs indigenous systems for secrecy, security and inter-operability, it is superior in the LCA compared to any aircraft in the IAF’s inventory.

So it is a fallacy to think that we can continue the importing spree and still have such network-centric capability.

As recently as in 2005, the IAF’s requirement for 126 new aircraft was only for an upgraded Mirage 2000. At Rs.120 crore to Rs.140 crore a plane, compared to at least double that amount for any of the aircraft types now bidding for the 126 MRCA, is not the LCA a highly cost-effective fighter for volume induction into the IAF?

As for development costs, the LCA has remained well within the sanctioned $1.2 billion — which is about the lowest anywhere. Time overrun in the strict sense is only by a year or two, despite the sanctions. A first-of-type aircraft of this degree of complexity has not been developed anywhere in the West or in Russia in less than two to three decades.

The F16 series that was inducted into the U.S. Air Force in 1975 is today at Mark 60. That is how aircraft of this level of complexity are improved after induction. That this imperative applies even more to the LCA has to be recognised.

It is for the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister to ensure that this effort is not belittled or scuttled, and that the LCA programme is given all-out support — as successive Prime Ministers have ensured for our atomic energy and space programmes.

(Ashok Parthasarathi was Science Adviser to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Vice- Admiral (retired) Raman Puri was Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to the Chairman, Committee of Service Chiefs, remaining closely involved with the inter-service weapons acquisition process from October 2003 to February 2006).

This sums up what all the detractors of the 'DDM' have been saying for the past decade or more, and far more eloquently than I could have ever hoped. (for the uninitiated, DDM - "Desi Defence Media", more usually abbreviated perjoratively as "Desi Dork Media")

The LCA compares extremely well with similar programs when you look at the challenges that had to be overcome. Even with regards to time, it is as good as the other 4.5 gen combat aircraft. The article makes that extremely clear.

Even with regards to the time, it blows to smithereens the myth that LCA has overrun its cost of 560 crores (which was only the initial allocated sum, and not the total project cost).

Rajiv Singh of domain-b has written an even more brutal repartee to the Media lies, and mauls apart all that the English language press uses to cover their fabrications, without even leaving them a fig leaf of credibility or truth to cover their shame with. This five page bloodbath at http://www.domain-b.com/aero/20080218_duds01.html has been aptly titled "India's Light Combat Aircraft: When duds begin to fly news". Makes for extremely interesting reading. Take a look.

Notes on India - Jay Nordlinger

Jay Nordlinger had this very interesting Impromptus series in the National Review about his 3-week long trip to India (Mumbai, Gujarat and Rajasthan). It makes for engaging reading...

Called "Notes on India", this eight part series isn't Fromer's guide to world travel, nor does it offer a stereotypical view of India. Rather, its a picture book in words, encapsulating a thousand different views, smells and encounters into snippets, captions without pictures. If you havent visited India yet, this may tingle your tastes like the aroma of spices from Indian cuisine.

Take a look:
Part 1 - Part 2 - Part 3 - Part 4 - Part 5 - Part 6 - Part 7 - Part 8