Tickling a feinting dragon

Apologies for the outdated post you'll be reading... I'd planned to post it after the 2nd day of the NSG meet, but as things so often happen, I found myself looking at the train as it passed me by. Still, even though the deal is now done (Hurray??), I didn't feel like putting this piece to the trash, so here it is, a whole 3 days late.... Please give me your opinions.


The goings on in the NSG and out are laughable - and not in a good sense; more in the sort of laugh that movie characters end up giving when victory turns to impending doom, when there isn't any hope, and they're amazed at the unbelievable turn of events.

I'm talking of course about China's "U-turn" on the Nuke deal, after "expressing its support" for our Nuclear Ambitions earlier (goddam desi media can't read a thing right, can they?).

TimesNow called this stance "nuanced". Not so I say. CNN-IBN has termed it a "broadside". Not so again, Sir. I'm now expecting some half-assed TV opinionator to call it a betrayal.

Except that in the case of China's "turn-around" on the Nuke Deal issue, it really wasn't unexpected to close watchers of the game. Ajai Shukla has an excellent analysis of Chinese thought process on his blog (China's strategic thinking: A gold medal for mental gymnastics). That somewhat unrelated report has a lot of insights to apply to what our government is now facing.

Chinese thought, deeply influenced by Sun Zhe's classic on warfighting and strategic thinking, has a few principles that underline its actions. First, never fight a battle you aren't ready for - The "Hot Peace" is a common feature (a concept also elucidated by Chanakya). Second, don't do something (eg. lead a war) when someone is already doing it for you. And, if it does require, never hesitate to attack with all your might. And lastly, no promise can stand against an iron fist (as indicated by their repeated disregard for laws, treaties, and promises in their single-minded pursuit of national pride, strength and greatness).

Unfortunately, our own South Block Mandarins, hamstrung by their own personal problems, failed to read the Chinese, or if they did, weren't able to come up with a suitable battle plan. And all indicators say that they did anticipate such a move by the Chinese. Any reasonably regular reader of the diplomatic winds would have been able to see the storm coming.

The Battleground:

1. China is absolutely wary of any nation being able to challenge it in any respect. As the new leader of the third world, it is trying desperately to bring nations into its warm, tight embracing fold of renmenbi (yuan for common folk), guns, aircrafts and technology and secure its energy and mineral needs for the coming 50 years.
   
   The last thing they'd want is a challenger to any of these, and certainly not one with such a strong hold over the energy routes as India, and even worse, a neighbour and an old leader of the poor (although that nehruvian idealism was both flawed and useless, and is now, dead).



2. The US has already signaled its wariness of a powerful China in no uncertain terms. China already sees the US as an enemy (and an ideal of power that they look up to as well). Any tie up with India will (and already has) set alarm bells ringing in Zhongnanhai, PRC's corridor of power.
   
   Beijing's alarm of US doesn't extend to India, which it views with a more patronizing and condescending viewpoint (read any internet forum populated by Chinese posters, and you'll see the picture pretty soon, even among the civil and friendly ones too). That condescension only increases their eagerness to keep Indian interests far away from their (expanding) sphere of influence.
   



3. Pakistan is a friend China needs, and not just as an enemy's enemy - the land route afforded to Xinjiang and energy security gained by removing the need to traverse the US-infested Malaccas is attractive to China, as is the foothold that Pakistan affords due to its standing among Muslim nations. And anything that is bad for the Land of the Pure is of concern to its leige-lord.

Still, China cannot take on India head on - not because of what India could do (honestly, with such a weak system, Indian responses to provocations have only made for dinnerside humor at the tables in Beijing and Islamabad), but because of what a spat between two heavy-weights will do to an image-conscious China. Their aim right now, and for the next 10-15 years is to keep quiet, maintain good relations, grow, become powerful, and then roar to subjugate the world, and report with China and dispute on the same page is bad. Neither would they like to take on the US, whose markets are sustaining Chinese manufacturing growth for the time being, and whose opinion matters to a whole load of Chinese business clients.

Hence, their reticence to come out with an open opinion about the Nuke deal. Till now, that is. However, this wasn't unexpected. As their sabre-rattling in 2005 alarmed our government into appeasement (whitewashing of the incursions in Sikkim, a flurry of official visits by the high and mighty among the Indian leadership, ignoring China's strategic throttling of our bilateral relations with neighbouring countries, courtesy their "string of pearls" doctrine, and eyes shut to Chinese barks on various issues).

The Game Plan:

1. From the very beginning, it was China that had our guys worried. Early grumblings notwithstanding, the Chinese silence after that probably got a few hopes up, as did the improving bilateral relations (our perception as always). But a Chinese silence is no comfort, not to us anyway. Repeated attempts to get a clear opinion from them failed - coaxing, prodding, even wrong news reports (in the hope that Chinese reaction would shed light) couldn't move China to show its cards that early in the game (Patient waiting - another Chinese trait).
   
   It was here that we should have taken a slightly stronger line. Press China for a response. Heat up things a bit on the border issue as well as with our defense capabilities, while at the same time showing China what it had to gain by supporting us. Even better, get America to do that. Its a risky game - too little pressure and they wouldn't budge; too much and the opinion would only turn against us. Instead, we did the Indian thing and decided to leave things till they boiled - escape from the task at hand. And China was happy too. Wait and watch - strategy for battles, applied to statecraft.



2. China didn't really need to talk or be heard till now - after all, they were able to ride on their lapdogs, the Indian Left's antics to scuttle the deal, and before that, the certain political wranglings within the Indian system. What they probably hadn't counted on was the Congress' determination to get the deal pushed, even at risk of death. Then again, they achieved a one years delay. Then, there wasn't much to be gained by talking at the IAEA, where only a simple majority was needed. Why do that when a no vote at the NSG would be a veto.



3. The NSG was where China had planned to set up its ambush point. Classic military tactics here too - instead of meeting the enemy on level ground, attack and choke him where the road is narrow and chance of escape is slim; where you have a huge advantage.
   
   Again, if there were signs from the small nations that they would oppose the deal no matter what, perhaps China wouldn't have needed to open out. I guess Prez. Bush's decision to personally lobby for the deal with the dissenters and possible signs of easing off by them spurred the leaders to take control.



4. The People's Daily piece and the Chinese spokesperson's comments are not aimed at India... they're aimed at the nations which would take solace in the knowledge that they'll have a strong nation to support them if matters came to a head. It was also a way of reminding people about possible reasons they'd have to say nay to the deal - Non-proliferation (however flawed and hypocritical the concept may be), hatred of US's overbearing attitude, or simply a way for them to squeeze something. Notice the clever way in which the piece talks about the reason why the NPT was created in the first place (India's '74 tests).
   
   Mind you, the game isn't over yet - the Chinese have a lot of cards yet. They'd still take the backseat, and not oppose the deal any more than they already have, nor take leadership in the issue. Leave the barking and fighting and suggesting changes to the smaller countries, and wait for India to say enough is enough and draw the line. That way, they can paint us as the stubborn ones, the ones to blame.
   
   Alternatively, they can quietly support a whole range of overbearing conditions. And in case all other nations decide that its not a bad thing at all, they may CONSIDER vetoing the deal. Remember, NSG is not an organization - its a cartel, where every member can veto an agreement.
   
   But this option will be dangerous for China, and one they'd very carefully consider before implementing. Chinese torpedoeing of the deal will bring them the unmitigated animosity of India and the US (although that will depend upon how the next administration looks at it). It will not be easy for them to destroy whatever progress they've made with India. More importantly, such an action could cost them the goodwill and support of some nations, which they've painstakingly earned after the Olympics. But that seems like a relatively mild prospect.
   
   In all likelihood, China will not keep itself at the forefront of this. It may back the smaller pomeranian nations that are barking away at the NSG, and have secret meetings to support them. But if America does step up its backdoor negotiations and probably give a tough word or two to the Chinese, they should grumble, but will most likely back off and abstain... either way, there is no way we can expect a Chinese yes vote for the 123 Deal.
   

But certainly, if China plays an instrumental role in destroying almost 8 years of painstaking embroidary, it will only earn them the animosity of the Congress Party. I see that as a good thing - a bright sliver in a very very dark cloud; for it will give us, a eunuch nation, a chance to act and think decisively (much like the Chinese). Take the strong line and act on it, unlike our previous all-talk-and-no-action farces.

If the deal goes through, China will be a big loser - not only will it have lost all its good relations with India and a good deal of support in US, but it will lose the trust of the nations it has been supporting. Its a zero sum game - India's win is China's loss; China's gain will be an Indian disaster.

My only hope is that if the deal does go bust, we will not think of it as a small disappointment. And if it does go through, we'd better make the Chinese know exactly what we think of them - in diplomatic style, of course!

A translation of the latest Chinese re is available at:
http://svaradarajan.blogspot.com/2008/09/peoples-daily-commentary-on-indian.html

For those who think that this was unexpected, read this Chinese release from 2005:

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200510/27/print20051027_217234.html

Masterful Butchery and Rapier wit

The whole blogosphere seems to be heaving a collective sigh of relief at the Left-UPA divorce after 4 years of matrimonial horror (make that 3, counting out the first Honeymoon year). Doubtless that most of them fine folks favour a centre-right viewpoint (my observation in general), but even the most objective student of our present situation will agree that this cut is a good thing.

First of all, it took a long time for the UPA to realize that the Left parties were taking a free ride on both the pro-govt and opposition backs. By cowardly giving only outside support, they ensured that they could take their own viewpoints on different agendas and gather votes. I'm sure that when he made that momentous decision in 2004, Surjeet Singh would have also salivated at the electoral prospects of acting as a peacemaker and mediator between both sides of the spectrum.

Unfortunately, the great Carrot seems to have got his head spun backwards; sticking to hopeless dogma and strict overseas instructions in not budging. If UPA-Left relations soured in 2005, don't blame the nuke deal for it, the tension had been building the moment Karat put his fingers into the Central Governance pie and found the pudding soft, malleable and tasty.

And given the amount of pliability the Congress has shown the Left in agreeing to all their demands just to keep the ruling Dynasty in power, its not hard to figure out the reason for Karat and Cos' smugness. Unfortunately for them, the beam snapped, as beams are wont to do when pushed too far.

It is here that I admire the masterstrokes that 10, Janpath has wrought to the political Picasso over the past month or two. Regular readers of this blog would probably know that I'm not a great fan of the Congress party. While do think their local leaders are among the best there are, the micromanagement from the Central Dynasty has ruined it all. I'm certainly skeptical about Sonia Gandhi's administrative capability. The next generation of princes too worry me.

But for all the criticisms, We've got to admit, Sonia-ben is a dab hand at political masterstrokes, and regularly shows glimpses of her mother-in-law's cold, calculating ruthlessness (who can forget the coup that kicked out Kesri and brought her in).

In appeasing the Commies over the past year by keeping the Nuke deal in the background while gaining leverage from their co-operation during local polls, the UPA probably made a calculated decision to cut off the relationship before it became a millstone in preparing for the polls, and pushing through the related policies.

In effect, by wooing the SP close to them, and making the announcement in Tokyo rather than back in Delhi, the Congress upset the Left's well-laid out plans, and in one sweep of the blade, cut their leverage to nothing. Seize the advantage, and you win. It was a move worthy of Don Corleone.

Not only has Sonia's strategy defanged the BJP's assertion that the government is weak, but, with the SP in its pocket, has removed the Left's chances of cobbling together a Third Front next year. And if the inflation situation does ease out, we may very well see the Congress coming back to power with a similar, if not slightly higher number of seats.


As I see more of Sonia Gandhi, one's respect for her grows. Not for her idealism or administrative prowess (for she has little aptitude for the latter, and even less of the former), but her tactics. She has proven to be an excellent player at the game of intrigue, and a clever operative. Its Godfather meets James Bond. I can't think of any other leader who plays this game better. Advani may be a good mass mover, and Arun Jaitley a great strategist in planning polls, Sonia is more than a match for both in silent killing.

Unfortunately, The problem arises when she puts the family position ahead of the Party, refusing to yield power to the local leaders, and creating a web of local, infighting satraps. Karnataka was the best example of this disastrous policy. Perhaps then, its time that Sonia starts looking out for her Party rather than family.

Till then, lets pop the champagne at the removal of the Red boulder in the country's path, and pray that it doesn't come crashing down on the UPA during the next Lok Sabha Session

Vassals of the Dragon Kingdom

The Chinese call their nation "Zhong Guo", or literally, "Middle Country". More explicitly, its their way of asserting the primacy of all things Chinese, and reaffirm how their nation is the centre of the world.

Nothing wrong in this worldview at all. After all, every single country thinks the same of itself. The problem is when others forget their own loyalties and patriotism and reiterate the same views. I'm of course talking about the Left parties of India. Its pretty obvious by now that CPI(M), CPI, and co. have absolutely no interest in keeping India alive. They were overtly supportive of the chinese aggression in '62 (only the threat of a treason charge made them come to their senses, after which they have been a bit more discreet). If recent evidence from the CIA Family Jewels and the Mitrokhin Archives are to be believed, they were, and still are ideal recruiting grounds for Russian, and later, Chinese intelligence agencies.

Its these fake patriots, the hypocritical idealists and third international seeking apparitchiks from Little Beijing in Kolkota who are the biggest danger to our stability, more so now that they have the government by the gonads (tiny as they may be).

This report from ToI probably best describes the hypocrisy of the Maroon (more red than the reds) parties:

Left silent as House erupts over Tibet crackdown
18 Mar 2008, 0159 hrs IST

NEW DELHI: Usually at the forefront of action in Parliament, particularly over human rights issues, the Left presented a muted picture on Monday as MPs expressed anguish and concern over the crackdown on protesting monks in Tibet.

As MPs demanded that the government condemn the Chinese action, Left members remained silent spectators. In Lok Sabha, BJP, BJD and SP members criticized the crackdown in Tibet and some like Gorakhpur MP Adityanath took a sharp dig at Left MPs, referring to them as "China’s representatives" in Parliament.

Though a much smaller provocation, particularly from BJP, would normally have had Left benches on their feet, this time around they heard the yogi out without saying a word.

Adityanath said that Chinese brutality in Tibet reflected Beijing's expansionist mindset and urged the government to intervene. He pointed out that China had expressed disdain for Indian sensibilities on issues like Arunachal Pradesh where even a visit by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was enough cause for a Chinese protest. A similarly intolerant attitude was reflected in the action against Tibetan monks.

The Left's silence was all the more striking as the "Red" parties have spent most of last year strenuously denying that their opposition to the India-US nuclear deal had anything to do with their "soft" spot for China which has not been too comfortable about India officially becoming a member of the nuclear club.

The refusal to be even mildly critical of China coincided with the "off-the-record" insinuation from UPA partners that CPM and others have been blocking the nuclear deal with the US because of their sympathies with China.

The anger over Chinese "repression", expressed by others like BJP’s V K Malhotra, SP's Ramjilal Suman and BJD's B Mahtab, did put the government in a spot. Though MPs made it a point to note that Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama had spoken of autonomy and not independence, it was not easy for government to concede the opposition's demands as India walks a tightrope with China on border issues.

The proceedings in Lok Sabha also brought out the dilemma that government faces in formulating its stand on Tibet. While India cannot condone the scale of the Chinese crackdown and the drive to deny Tibetans their culture and religion, any overtly sympathetic stance towards the "independence" demand raised by the protesters will be fraught with implications for Jammu and Kashmir too.

This compulsion was evident when foreign minister Pranab Mukherjee limited himself to reiterating the official response released on Saturday that India was concerned over the unsettled conditions, violence and deaths of innocent people in Tibet. When NDA staged a walkout, expressing its dissatisfaction with the minister's remarks, Mukherjee said the Opposition alliance had adopted no different policy with regard to China when it had held office.

"There has been no change since 1959," he said, pointing out that BJP veteran Atal Bihari Vajpayee had been foreign minister in 1977 and visited China as PM later.

In Rajya Sabha, raising the issue during zero hour, former foreign minister Yashwant Sinha (BJP) said what was happening in Tibet was Chinese misrule and a cultural genocide. He said what was worse was that the Chinese government had termed it "people's war" against people of China.

Sinha also criticized the Indian government for the repression against Tibetans settled here. "Good relation with China does not mean being a mute spectator," he said, demanding a response from the government.

Bravo! Bravo! Now, if only the BJP had the balls to start the process when they were in power. One hopes that they will walk the walk when they come back to power.

Just so Stories- How Pakistan got its bomb

Here's a Guardian Report about how the US turned a blind eye to Pakistan's Nuclear activities, and even helped it along:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/pakistan/Story/0%2C%2C2188777%2C00.html

The man who knew too much

He was the CIA's expert on Pakistan's nuclear secrets, but Rich Barlow was thrown out and disgraced when he blew the whistle on a US cover-up. Now he's to have his day in court. Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark report

Saturday October 13, 2007
The Guardian

Rich Barlow idles outside his silver trailer on a remote campsite in Montana - itinerant and unemployed, with only his hunting dogs and a borrowed computer for company. He dips into a pouch of American Spirit tobacco to roll another cigarette. It is hard to imagine that he was once a covert operative at the CIA, the recognised, much lauded expert in the trade in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

He prepared briefs for Dick Cheney, when Cheney was at the Pentagon, for the upper echelons of the CIA and even for the Oval Office. But when he uncovered a political scandal - a conspiracy to enable a rogue nation to get the nuclear bomb - he found himself a marked man.

Article continues

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In the late 80s, in the course of tracking down smugglers of WMD components, Barlow uncovered reams of material that related to Pakistan. It was known the Islamic Republic had been covertly striving to acquire nuclear weapons since India's explosion of a device in 1974 and the prospect terrified the west - especially given the instability of a nation that had had three military coups in less than 30 years . Straddling deep ethnic, religious and political fault-lines, it was also a country regularly rocked by inter-communal violence. "Pakistan was the kind of place where technology could slip out of control," Barlow says.

He soon discovered, however, that senior officials in government were taking quite the opposite view: they were breaking US and international non-proliferation protocols to shelter Pakistan's ambitions and even sell it banned WMD technology. In the closing years of the cold war, Pakistan was considered to have great strategic importance. It provided Washington with a springboard into neighbouring Afghanistan - a route for passing US weapons and cash to the mujahideen, who were battling to oust the Soviet army that had invaded in 1979. Barlow says, "We had to buddy-up to regimes we didn't see eye-to-eye with, but I could not believe we would actually give Pakistan the bomb.

How could any US administration set such short-term gains against the long-term safety of the world?" Next he discovered that the Pentagon was preparing to sell Pakistan jet fighters that could be used to drop a nuclear bomb.

Barlow was relentless in exposing what he saw as US complicity, and in the end he was sacked and smeared as disloyal, mad, a drunk and a philanderer. If he had been listened to, many believe Pakistan might never have got its nuclear bomb; south Asia might not have been pitched into three near-nuclear conflagrations; and the nuclear weapons programmes of Iran, Libya and North Korea - which British and American intelligence now acknowledge were all secretly enabled by Pakistan - would never have got off the ground. "None of this need have happened," Robert Gallucci, special adviser on WMD to both Clinton and George W Bush, told us. "The vanquishing of Barlow and the erasing of his case kicked off a chain of events that led to all the nuclear-tinged stand-offs we face today. Pakistan is the number one threat to the world, and if it all goes off - a nuclear bomb in a US or European city- I'm sure we will find ourselves looking in Pakistan's direction."

US aid to Pakistan tapered off when the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. Dejected and impoverished, in 1987 Pakistan's ruling military responded by selling its nuclear hardware and know-how for cash, something that would have been obvious to all if the intelligence had been properly analysed. "But the George HW Bush administration was not looking at Pakistan," Barlow says. "It had new crises to deal with in the Persian Gulf where Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait."

As the first Gulf war came to an end with no regime change in Iraq, a group of neoconservatives led by Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney, Lewis "Scooter" Libby and Donald Rumsfeld were already lobbying to finish what that campaign had started and dislodge Saddam. Even as the CIA amassed evidence showing that Pakistan, a state that sponsored Islamist terrorism and made its money by selling proscribed WMD technology, was the number one threat, they earmarked Iraq as the chief target.

When these neocons came to power in 2001, under President George W Bush, Pakistan was indemnified again, this time in return for signing up to the "war on terror". Condoleezza Rice backed the line, as did Rumsfeld, too. Pakistan, although suspected by all of them to be at the epicentre of global instability, was hailed as a friend. All energies were devoted to building up the case against Iraq.

It is only now, amid the recriminations about the war in Iraq and reassessments of where the real danger lies, that Barlow - the despised bringer of bad news about Pakistan - is finally to get a hearing. More than 20 years after this saga began, his case, filed on Capitol Hill, is coming to court later this month. His lawyers are seeking millions of dollars in compensation for Barlow as well as the reinstatement of his $80,000 a year government pension. Evidence will highlight what happened when ideologues took control of intelligence in three separate US administrations - those of Reagan, and of the two Bushes - and how a CIA analyst who would not give up his pursuit for the truth became a fall guy.

At first Barlow thought he was helping safeguard the world. "I just loved it," he says. His focus from the start was Pakistan, at the time suspected of clandestinely seeking nuclear weapons in a programme initiated by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the father of Benazir. "Everywhere I looked I kept coming up against intelligence about Pakistan's WMD programme," Barlow says. "I thought I was telling them what they needed to hear, but the White House seemed oblivious." Immersed in the minutiae of his investigations, he didn't appreciate the bigger picture: that Pakistan had, within days of Reagan's inauguration in 1981, gone from being an outcast nation that had outraged the west by hanging Bhutto to a major US ally in the proxy war in Afghanistan.

Within months Barlow was out of a job. A small band of Republican hawks, including Paul Wolfowitz, had convinced the president that America needed a new strategy against potential nuclear threats, since long-term policies such as détente and containment were not working. Reagan was urged to remilitarise, launch his Star Wars programme and neutralise ACDA. When the agency's staff was cut by one third, Barlow found himself out of Washington and stacking shelves in a food store in Connecticut, where he married his girlfriend, Cindy. He was not on hand in 1984 when intelligence reached the ACDA and the CIA that Pakistan had joined the nuclear club (the declared nuclear powers were Britain, France, the US, China and Russia) after China detonated a device on Pakistan's behalf.

Soon after, Barlow was re-employed to work as an analyst, specialising in Pakistan, at the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research (OSWR). The CIA was pursuing the Pakistan programme vigorously even though Reagan was turning a blind eye - indeed, Reagan's secretary of state, George Schultz, claimed in 1985: "We have full faith in [Pakistan's] assurance that they will not make the bomb."

Back on a government salary, Barlow, aged 31, moved to Virginia with his wife Cindy, also a CIA agent. From day one, he was given access to the most highly classified material. He learned about the workings of the vast grey global market in dual-use components - the tools and equipment that could be put to use in a nuclear weapons programme but that could also be ascribed to other domestic purposes, making the trade in them hard to spot or regulate. "There was tonnes of it and most of it was ending up in Islamabad," he says. "Pakistan had a vast network of procurers, operating all over the world." A secret nuclear facility near Islamabad, known as the Khan Research Laboratories, was being fitted out with components imported from Europe and America "under the wire". But the CIA obtained photographs. Floor plans. Bomb designs. Sensors picked up evidence of high levels of enriched uranium in the air and in the dust clinging to the lorries plying the road to the laboratories. Barlow was in his element.

However, burrowing through cables and files, he began to realise that the State Department had intelligence it was not sharing - in particular the identities of key Pakistani procurement agents, who were active in the US. Without this information, the US Commerce Department (which approved export licences) and US Customs (which enforced them) were hamstrung.

Barlow came to the conclusion that a small group of senior officials was physically aiding the Pakistan programme. "They were issuing scores of approvals for the Pakistan embassy in Washington to export hi-tech equipment that was critical for their nuclear bomb programme and that the US Commerce Department had refused to license," he says. Dismayed, he approached his boss at the CIA, Richard Kerr, the deputy director for intelligence, who summoned senior State Department officials to a meeting at CIA headquarters in Langley. Barlow recalls: "Kerr tried to do it as nicely as he could. He said he understood the State Department had to keep Pakistan on side - the State Department guaranteed it would stop working against us."

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Indo-US Nuclear Deal- Full Text

Manoj Joshi, whose blog is both interesting and eloquent, has been kind enough to trawl through the MEA's website and find the full text document of the Indo-US 123 Deal (in pdf format).

If you're interested in reading and analyzing it, you can check out the download link at http://www.savefile.com/files/946023. The file will be up for a month (more, depending upon the number of downloads).

The full text can also be found on the US State Department Website at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/aug/90050.htm

While you're at it, you can also download the July 18 2005 Agreement text (pdf document) from the MEA website (Bilateral Treaties and Documents section):

Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005: India’s Separation Plan